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ABSTRACT. Interpretations involve relating facts nomically. "Candidate B's receiving the majority of votes
tabulated was an act of theft" is a paradigm, since it presupposes an explanation in terms of personal agency and
intention. At the core of explanations are subjunctive conditionals or universal generalizations supporting such
conditionals, and we may explicate the notion of an interpretation in such terms. Can subjunctive conditionals then
ever be acceptable basic premises? As we may distinguish causal, personal, legal explanations, so we may
distinguish causal, personal, i.e. empirical subjunctives from legal and perhaps other subjunctives. In each case, we
may identify a belief-generating mechanism—empirical intuition versus pragmatic intuition—that generates basic
beliefs. We may argue that a subjunctive belief is acceptable if the mechanism is presumptively reliable. In this
paper, we carry this out for causal subjunctives and causal intuition—empirical intuition in its causal employment.
We believe this issue is advanced by recent work in naturalistic epistemology, namely Hilary Kornblith's Inductive
Inference and Its Natural Ground. We develop the implications of this approach for the acceptability of causal
subjunctives as basic premises.

1. Introduction.
A classic distinction in rhetoric identifies three types of questions that may be raised over
some disputed issue:
An sit — Did something happen? — Did candidate B receive a majority of the votes as
tabulated?
Quid sit — What sort of thing happened? — Was candidate B's receiving a majority of
the tabulated votes an honest result or election fraud?
Quale sit — What is the value of what happened? — If the election was fraudulent, were
those responsible justified in stealing the election? (Compare Kruger 1975: 137.)

Answers to these questions constitute three distinct types of statements—descriptions,
interpretations, and evaluations. We believe that determining whether a statement may be taken
as an acceptable basic premise in an argument—a premise thath is not argued for on the basis of
other premises, at least in the course of that argument—involves centrally determining the type
of statement involved.1 Indeed, we propose three questions for determining premise
acceptability:
What type of state is it?
What source vouches for it?
Does this voucher create a presumption for the statement?

That is, in light of the answers to the first two questions, would the burden of proof be
shifted to a challenger to show why the statement should not be taken as a premise? In (2000),
we argued that the description/interpretation/evaluation distinction is appropriate for classifying
contingent or logically non-determinate statements.

1.

. We have discussed these issues in (1991: 344-47).

1
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Rhetoricians have characterized interpretations as raising issues of definition. This strikes us
as misleading on two grounds. First, it is a commonplace that some analytic statements are true
by definition. But intuitively, they are not interpretations. Secondly, some statements contain
technical terms, e.g.,
That berm is less than 5' wide.

Unless we understand the definition of `berm,' we shall not understand the statement. But
given the definition,
`Berm' means `the shoulder of a road'

the sentence,
That shoulder of the road is less than 5' wide

makes the same statement, which thus states straightforwardly whether something is the case. It
is a description, not an interpretation. However, the rhetorical characterization contains a crucial
insight, if we think not of linguistic meaning—what might be given through a definition of a
word—but meaning in the sense of putting in perspective. This accords with Sproule's
characterization of interpretations as placing facts into categories, relating them, placing them in
perspective. (Sproule 1980: 142, 144.) More specifically, meaning in this sense involves relating
facts nomically, in particular giving explanations. Taking
Candidate B's receiving the majority of votes tabulated was an act of theft.

as a paradigm of an interpretation, we see that this statement presupposes an explanation of the
fact of candidate B's receiving a majority of the votes. It explains the fact in terms of personal
agency and intention, with an imputation of personal responsibility.
But this explanation itself involves an interpretation. It relates certain actions either on the
part of candidate B or his partisans to a system of intention involving goals of some sort. The
actions become intelligible to us in light of these intentions. The explanation thus asserts both
that certain actions happened and that one or more individuals had certain intentions—matters of
description—and that the intentions and actions were nomically related, the interpretation proper.
But what of the statement claiming or asserting this nomic relation? We believe that the
statement could be cast into the following form or at least would support such a statement:
If agent A were to have a conscious purpose to bring about goal G and were to believe that
doing M were (part of) the (optimal) means to bring about G, then A would do M. (Compare
Freeman 2000: 153.)
Thus the core explanatory statement either is or supports a subjunctive conditional. We
regard this as highly significant. Explanations involve nomic or lawlike generalizations of a
universal or statistical sort. But it is the hallmark of such generalizations to support subjunctive
conditionals. At the core then of explanations in general are subjunctive conditionals or universal
generalizations supporting such conditionals. Rhetoricians, Sproule in particular, have identified
a number of types of interpretations. We may ask then whether these various types may be seen
as expressing subjunctives. May some types of interpretations, even though they do not express
such subjunctives, be nonetheless defined in terms of those subjunctives? Can the classification
of interpretations overall be systematized in light of the subjunctive? Looking at certain other
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paradigms of interpretations, causal and dispositional statements, suggests a positive answer to
this question.
Heating pure water to 100°C at air pressure of sea level causes it to boil.

Clearly this can be paraphrased as
If pure water were to be heated to 100°C at air pressure of sea level, it would boil.
Sugar is soluble in water.

Likewise this statement may be straightforwardly paraphrased to make the implicit
subjunctive explicit:
If sugar were placed in water, it would dissolve.

In (200x) we develop a positive answer to this question. Reviewing that answer is beyond
the scope of this paper. But in light of that answer, the issue of whether interpretations may ever
be acceptable basic premises involves at core the issue of whether subjunctive conditionals can
ever serve as basic premises. How may we then advance that issue?
2. Types of Explanations, Types of Subjunctives, and Intuition
The key to approaching acceptability for interpretations as basic premises is determining
whether subjunctives may under certain circumstances be properly basic beliefs. Having
connected subjunctives with explanations, the next step is to distinguish types of explanations on
the basis of how their covering law generalizations come to be discovered and thus on the basis
ultimately of the belief-generating mechanisms involved. We may identify two major types of
explanation as causal and personal. In a causal explanation of some event or phenomenon, the
occurrence is explained in terms of some antecedent event or phenomenon and a certain dispositional property or properties of the substances involved in that event.
1. The match lit because it was struck.
This explanation appeals to a certain dispositional property of the match which spells out
certain conditions, individually necessary and jointly sufficient, for the match to light.
2. If the match were struck with a force of a certain magnitude (or greater), in the presence
of oxygen, the match being dry, then it would light.
This explanation thus appeals to a nomic connection between striking a match and its
lighting, expressible through a subjunctive conditional, together with the fact that the match was
struck. Since this explanation seeks to explain an event in the material world through some
antecedent event and some physical regularity, it is also a physical explanation. Physical
explanations clearly are a subclass of causal explanations.
By contrast, personal explanations appeal to the powers, beliefs, purposes, or intentions of
conscious, personal agents. (Swinburne 1996: 21-22.)
3. King Henry VIII sought to annul his marriage to Catherine of Aragon in order to remarry
and father a male heir. (Compare Nagel 1961: 19.)
This explanation is personal, attempting to render King Henry VIII's action understandable
in light of his reasons for it, which involve goals he has consciously intended and chosen. Not all
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explanations appealing to the psychological states of an agent need appeal to that agent's
conscious intentions, however. If one said that
4. The accused murdered the victim out of a consuming anger brought about by years of
taunting.
we are not explaining an action as intentionally chosen to accomplish some goal, but rather
as resulting from certain psychological "springs of action." (Compare Nagel 1961: 19.)
We are dealing with the motives rather than the reasons for action. This is a causal
explanation, albeit one appealing to a psychological rather than a physical cause. Explanations
dealing just with motives or other psychological sources of action are causal explanations.
Personal explanations appeal to reasons and not just to motives.
We can identify another type of explanation. Consider:
5. Jones received $10,000 because his late grandmother bequeathed him that amount of
money in her will.
Here we certainly have an explanation of why Jones received $10,000. We could make this
explanation explicit in the classic deductive nomological pattern of many physical
explanations—or at least in a syllogistic nomological pattern, since the law here
6. If one has been bequeathed a certain amount of money, one receives that money upon the
demise of the person making the bequest.
is defeasible. But unlike physical explanations, the law here is not a law of nature but a matter of
statute law. We have then a legal explanation in this case rather than a physical causal
explanation.
Legal explanations differ in one central respect from the causal and personal explanations
we have already distinguished. The covering generalization appealed to is not a matter ultimately
of empirical discovery but is rather given in or derivable from some body of statute law. One
does not discover that signing a contract creates legal rights and obligations they way one
discovers that signing the contract lowers the amount of ink left in the pen. Legal explanations
are a paradigm of types of explanation appealing to given as opposed to empirically discovered
covering generalizations. Consider some classification scheme, for example a scheme for some
branch of taxonomy. One could explain why an individual is of some genus by pointing out that
the individual is a member of a species that the taxonomic scheme subsumes under the genus.
Prescinding from any justification of the classification system and appealing to that system as
given, we have here what we might call an explanation via classification. Such explanations, like
legal explanations, thus appeal to some given generalization.
This survey reveals that for epistemological purposes we may distinguish two fundamental
types of explanations depending on whether their covering generalizations come to be known or
are ultimately supported "from below" through experience of the events and persons in the world
around us, or "from above" through understanding some nomic system. Causal and personal
explanations involve some apprehension of general connections in the world around us resulting
in an empirical albeit nomic belief or accepting an empirical nomic statement. Legal explanations, by contrast, are based on our apprehension of general connections given in some system of
statute law.
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This leads us to an epistemological classification of subjunctives. As we have distinguished
causal, personal, legal, and perhaps other types of explanations, so we may speak of causal
subjunctives, personal subjunctives or subjunctives of freedom, legal subjunctives. More
broadly, we may distinguish empirical subjunctives, including causal and personal subjunctives,
from what we might call pragmatic subjunctives of which legal subjunctives are a paradigm case.
In approaching the question then of whether subjunctives are ever properly basic beliefs, we
should separate empirical subjunctives from pragmatic subjunctives. In each case, we believe we
may identify a belief-generating mechanism that generates properly basic beliefs. We believe we
should call these mechanisms empirical intuition and pragmatic intuition.
That we denominate both of these mechanisms as forms of intuition gives us a key to
understanding how they operate and how we may assess the reliability of their operation. As
Cohen points out, in the way certain analytic philosophers use the term, intuition concerns "what
counts as a reason for what." (Cohen 1986: 73) To use Toulmin's terminology for the layout of
arguments, intuitions concern warrants, the principles by virtue of which we get from data to
claim. Intuition is one way in which warrants are grasped, and since warrants, properly
understood as inference rules, are implicit in an argument rather than stated explicitly, (Compare
Toulmin 1958: 100), intuition may be the principal way of grasping warrants. What does this
have to do with subjunctive conditionals? Corresponding to the inference rule
From

Fx

We may take it that

Gx

is the generalization
(∀x)( Fx ⊃ Gx)
But this clearly is not an accidental generalization. It supports a subjunctive conditional,
namely
(∀x)( Fx → Gx)
So corresponding to the warrants of inferences are generalized subjunctive conditionals. To
grasp the warrant is to come to believe at least implicitly the corresponding subjunctive
conditional. Thus if a type of intuition is a mechanism for grasping the warrants of arguments of
a certain type, it is also the mechanism for generating beliefs that the corresponding subjunctive
conditionals or universal generalizations of subjunctive conditionals hold. Furthermore, what
bears upon the reliability of the inference warrant bears upon the acceptability of the subjunctive
conditional. If one can reliably infer a conclusion from certain premises according to a given
inference pattern, then one can take the corresponding subjunctive as a premise in some further
argument. The reliability of intuition to grasp reliable warrants and the reliability of intuition as a
mechanism generating beliefs expressed in subjunctive conditionals amounts to the same thing.
Hence we may investigate the presumptive reliability of intuition as a belief-generating
mechanism by investigating its presumptive reliability in grasping warrants.
Making contact with one further structural distinction in Toulmin's layout of arguments
indicates the fruitfulness of this approach. Toulmin distinguishes between warrants, which
explain why data are relevant to claim, and backing for those warrants, which may be brought
forward to establish why a warrant is acceptable, why in Toulmin's words the warrant has
authority or currency (Toulmin 1958: 103.), why we are in fact licensed to move from those data
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to that claim. We may think of the backing as the input on which some form of intuition intuits
that something is a reason for something else, that from certain premises we may infer some
conclusion. Thus the backing is the input for the mechanism generating subjunctive beliefs. So
we may expect to get insight into the reliability of these belief-generating mechanisms as we get
insight into the reliability of the corresponding inferences given how they are backed.
Furthermore, as Toulmin points out, how warrants are backed differs widely from field to field.
Above we distinguished different types of subjunctives corresponding to different types of
explanations. Various types of explanation correspond to various fields of argument. We should
expect the inferences and their warrants to be backed in different ways and thus modes of
intuition as subjunctive belief-generating mechanisms to operate differently in different fields.
Thus we should expect our task of assessing whether these modes of intuition are presumptively
reliable to be much more straightforward if we can concentrate on just one field at a time and on
how inferences in those fields are backed. Due to reasons of space, in the remainder of this paper
we shall discuss just the field of causal arguments.
3. Causal Intuition as a Belief-Generating Mechanism
By means of causal intuition as a belief-generating mechanism, we come to believe certain
subjunctive conditionals or their universal generalizations that express or indicate causal
relations. I propose that the operation of causal intuition can be resolved into two factors:
detection of covariation and imposition of an interpretive category. In the general instance, that
category will be causal dependency. What do each of these factors involve? In nature, some
features regularly occur together, F is generally accompanied by G, if not universally, then with
some statistical uniformity (although not necessarily vice versa). Such occurring together is
covariation and the ability to recognize this is covariation detection.
We may not only come to believe that there is a constant conjunction here, we may come to
apprehend F as an independent variable and G as the dependent variable. In other words, we may
come to perceive F as a relevant variable with respect to G. This will involve an intuition of
agency involved with F. For example, one may notice that dropping a stick is always accompanied by a noise. But one may further apprehend dropping the stick as the independent variable
and making a noise as the dependent variable. In apprehending this, one is apprehending
dropping the stick as the causal agent in this case. But this means that we have brought a certain
interpretive category to our experience, namely that nature has relevant variables. Nature's
having relevant variables means that there are independent and dependent variables objectively
in nature, i.e. that there are objective causal dependencies between agent and that acted upon,
between cause and effect.
I believe that we can understand the operation of causal intuition in the general case, where
the category imposed is that of causal dependency, on analogy with the determinable/determinate
distinction or as in a sense moving from the determinable to the determinate. To say that in
nature there are <independent variable, dependent variable> ordered pairs is in effect to predicate
a determinable of nature. But on the basis of observing a particular covariation pattern, F with G,
I may come to perceive < G, F> as a particular instance of co-variation, that < G, F> is a
determinate falling under this determinable. By experience, I move from the determinable pattern
to the determinate instance.
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We have said that in the general instance with causal intuition, the category imposed is
causal dependency. But there is a special case that is very relevant to the issue of assessing the
reliability of causal intuition. We have spoken of covariation as if it were detected in individual
independent-dependent variable pairs. But in nature, there occur clusters of covariant properties,
sets of properties that tend to occur together, what Kornblith following Boyd calls homeostatic
property clusters. This notion is straightforwardly illustrated. At the level of observable
properties, we may easily recognize that some tend almost invariably, even uniformly, to go
together. For example, if something is an apple, it will have skin and flesh, each of a certain
texture, small brown seeds, a shape within certain roughly anticipated parameters. Furthermore,
as Kornblith points out in (1993), empirical evidence “suggests that we are, indeed, quite good
detectors of multiple, clustered covariation.” (Kornblith 1993: 101.) In such cases, one can
impose the category not of simple dependency but of natural kind. Instances of these clusters of
covariation will be seen as instances of some natural kind.
This has very specific implications for the operation of causal intuition. As the psychologists
Medin and Ortony point out, “People act as if their concepts contain essence placeholders that
are filled with ‘theories’ about what the corresponding entities are.” (Medin and Ortony 1989:
186; quoted in Kornblith 1993: 71.) For our purposes, let us say that natural kind concepts do
contain essence placeholders filled with theories about what is essential—causally essential—to
the natural kind. These theories may be very preliminary. But what they do at the least is to allow
us to divide the observable covariant properties into those seen to flow causally from the essence
and those that may be accidental. That is, the theory allows us to identify among the properties in
the covariant cluster those that are dependent variables, the effects of independent variables
which constitute the essence of this natural kind. The theory may, but need not, characterize what
those independent variables are. In general, they will involve nonobservable properties dealing
with the internal structure of instances of the natural kind. The more developed the
characterization, the less preliminary the theory.
As Kornblith develops in (1993), by means of our experience and these natural kind
concepts, we may come to make projections. For example, suppose I observe in a zoo that a
female platypus lays eggs. From this I project from something's being a female platypus to her
being an egg-layer. I thus acquire the corresponding subjunctive belief that if something were to
be a female platypus, she would be an egg-layer. In generating this subjunctive belief by
intuiting according to natural kinds, we may again see a move from determinable to determinate
analogous to the move with intuitions of causal dependency. Part of or closely bound up with the
essence of a species of living thing is having a mode of reproduction—reproducing in some way
or other. My experience indicates that for the platypus, this mode is egg-laying. Thus the
observable property of egg-laying is the determinate for platypuses of this determinable. What is
also significant here is that part of the essence of a natural kind is that the determinate of this
determinable is unique to the kind. It is not the case that some members of the species reproduce
in one way, others in another way. Hence once my experience discloses the specific mode of
reproduction of the species, I may project that mode to the entire natural kind. This is significant
for determining the presumptive reliability of causal intuition, to which we now turn.
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4. Presumptive Reliability of Causal Intuition
Let us begin by investigating whether causal intuition is presumptively reliable in its
operation with natural kinds. The issue of its reliability when intuiting causal dependency in
simple covariation can be straightforwardly assessed by contrast. Kornblith (1993) gives us an
argument for the overall reliability of causal intuition when making projections according to
natural kinds. Recall our illustration of a homeostatic property cluster through certain observable
properties of an apple that stably go together. Examples of stable collections of properties can be
easily multiplied. Such collections are subsets of wider stable collections that include
unobservable properties also. Furthermore, having these unobservable properties will explain
why objects have the observable properties they do and why these properties standardly occur
together in an object. Further yet, these unobservable properties may explain why certain
configurations of properties can hold together and others are not possible (causally possible).
Given this understanding of a homeostatic property cluster, we may lay out Kornblith's argument
quite straightforwardly:
1. Certain features of objects reside in homeostatic clusters. Therefore
2. There are real natural kinds in the world—the world is objectively divided into natural
kinds.
3. Human beings apprehend the world as divided into natural kinds.
4. Human beings are sensitive to those features of objects tending to reside in homeostatic
clusters, i.e. human beings are sensitive to the indicators of objective natural kinds. Therefore
5. Natural kinds as apprehended by humans match up with real kinds in nature.
6. What is apprehended as essential to a real kind is causally essential to that kind.
7. Humans project, i.e. make inferences, on the basis of what is essential to natural kinds.
Therefore
8. These projections, inferences are reliable at least to a significant degree.
Evaluating this argument is beyond the scope of this paper.2 Suffice it to say here that the
basic premises can all be defended and the inferential steps shown sound. The issue concerns
what this argument shows. Does (8) justify the claim that we may presume causal intuition to be
reliable when making projections according to natural kinds and thus to be reliable in generating
the subjunctive beliefs corresponding to the warrants of these projections?3 Has Kornblith shown
that the reliability of causal intuition is high enough to justify our accepting a particular causal
subjunctive which is the product of causal intuition—taking it as a basic premise in an argument
on the basis of its being vouched for by causal intuition? Three problems must be dealt with in
this connection. The first two arise from Kornblith's own discussion. Indeed the second involves
problems in covariation detection he himself considers. The third raises a deeper issue for causal
intuition in general, but paradoxically points the way to a resolution of these three problems. We

2.

. We present our evaluation in full in (200x), Chapter 8.5.

3.

. Besides presumptive reliability, we may also ask whether causal intuition in this employment generates
basic beliefs. We present our argument for that point in (200x), Chapter 8.5.
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shall also be able to discuss the reliability of intuiting causal dependencies in simple covariations
in connection with the second and third questions.
First, as Kornblith admits, reliability of empirical intuition is a function of what fills the
essence placeholder. "In having our inferences driven by a sensitivity to the deeper properties
which unite a kind, we are thereby drawing on what we know about the kind's essence. Insofar
as that knowledge is accurate, our inductive inferences will be reliable." (Kornblith 1993: 106,
italics added.) But in a given case of causal intuition, what guarantee is there that this knowledge
will be accurate? May we presume this in general? May we presume it when certain conditions
are satisfied? What are those conditions?
Secondly, certain examples that Kornblith discusses suggest that humans may be
overzealous in detecting covariation. This arises both in examples where covariation detection is
data-driven and where it is theory-driven. Data may suggest covariations which are not there and
these suggestions erroneously accepted. Theories may suggest that having certain properties
causally follows from the essence of some natural kind where this is false, yet projections are
erroneously made according to these suggestions. But surely incorporating these mistaken
suggestions affects the reliability of causal intuition both in intuiting according to natural kinds
and in intuiting causal dependencies.
Before considering the third problem, let us consider this second. The answer to the first will
emerge from this discussion. We can best deal with this problem by looking at the problematic
examples Kornblith considers. For the data-driven case, he presents the example of a population
of 150 people where two-thirds have a certain disease, one-third do not. There is also a certain
symptom. Two-thirds of the people who have this symptom also have the disease, while twothirds of the people without the symptom also have the disease. Hence, at least in this population,
the symptom is no sign of the disease. The statistics about this population are presented in the
following table:
DISEASE A
Present

Absent

Present

20

10

Absent

80

40

SYMPTOM
X

(see Kornblith 1993: 97). Concentrating just on the X/A or X/A and X/-A cells, many persons
claim that the symptom is a sign of the disease, while others, concentrating just on the -X/A and
-X/-A cells, claim that lack of the symptom is a sign of the disease.
For the "theory" driven case, undergraduates were shown a series of forty-five drawings
representing persons. Clinicians have asked patients to make such drawings in diagnosing
psychological disorders, believing that drawings that manifest certain features indicate certain
psychological problems. "For example, paranoid individuals are said to give emphasis to the
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eyes; those worried about intelligence are said to draw larger heads; those concerned about their
sexual identity give prominence to genital areas." (Kornblith 1993: 99.) Experimental work has
disconfirmed these associations. With the undergraduates, each drawing was presented
accompanied by a diagnostic label. Yet the drawings were carefully done so that those labelled
paranoid did not give any more prominence to the eyes than drawings bearing other labels, and
similarly for the other labels. There were no correlations to see, but the students claimed to see
them nonetheless, exactly those correlations the clinicians would expect.
This wholly useless diagnostic instrument is thus a product of common association, and
the fact that we tend to associate certain clinical problems with features of the body gives
rise to the illusory correlation. (Kornblith 1993: 100.)

Notice what the undergraduates are doing in this case. A clinical diagnostic category is in
effect a natural kind term. The common association of a category with a type of drawing as
symptom is (part of) a theory filling the essence placeholder. The undergraduates make their
erroneous projections that the drawings do in fact display these symptoms given these diagnostic
labels driven by these erroneous theories. So the problem of theory-driven erroneous covariation
detection is included in the fist problem for causal intuition, that of unreliable theories filling the
essence placeholders. Can we say that causal intuition is presumptively reliable if mistaken
theories can fill the essence placeholders in natural kind concepts and thus drive causal intuition?
We must note one further fact about the theory-driven example whose salience will appear
in due course. The undergraduates did not know that the drawings were used by clinicians as
diagnostic tools. Thus they did not know of the evidence showing these tools unreliable and
disconfirming their commonly accepted associations. On the other hand, clinicians did know of
the disconfirming evidence, yet they continued to use the drawings in making diagnoses. Thus in
continuing to accept these associations, the clinicians were disregarding evidence already in their
purview. They were accepting diagnoses grounded on less than all the evidence available to
them.
This is true also of the data-driven case. Consider the symptom-disease chart above. To see
that there is no covariation, positive or negative, between the symptom and the disease, one
needs to look at the chart as a whole. Attention just to those cells where the symptom is present
or just to those cells where the symptom is absent results in a mistaken judgment of covariation.
But the point is that those presented with the chart have all the evidence in front of them and are
making their mistaken judgment of covariance on the basis of less than all the information before
them.
This leads directly to the third problem for the presumptive reliability of causal intuition.
Whether or not one takes account of evidence before oneself is a matter of will. Thus, as Cohen
points out, there is a significant difference between the mechanism (or mechanisms) generating
causal beliefs and the mechanisms of perception or memory. The will can influence the
operations of the causal mechanism whereas it cannot so influence the descriptive mechanisms. I
am appeared to in a certain way and straight off form a perceptual belief. Unless I also have
evidence that my visual mechanism is not functioning properly or that I am in some peculiar
environment for which my visual apparatus was not designed, my belief is also acceptable. My
having the belief is a presumptive reason for my taking it as a premise. (Compare Cohen 1992:
130.) But, as Cohen points out, mistaken causal beliefs—at least about how Nature works—are
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quite common and therefore causal beliefs about nature's operations are not by themselves
presumptively acceptable. (Cohen 1992: 130) He diagnoses the problem this way:
What is the crucial difference between the kind of mechanism that generates
presumptively acceptable beliefs and the kind that generates beliefs which are not
presumptively acceptable?... Wherever there is standardly some opportunity for the
intrusion of a voluntary element into the mechanism, the kind of belief generated is not
presumptively acceptable, because a mistake may be made in the discharge of this
voluntary element. (Cohen 1992: 130-31)

Does this show that causal intuition is never presumptively reliable, that there is never a
presumption for the beliefs generated by causal intuition? We believe that Cohen's negative
diagnosis may be too hasty. Suppose there was a presumption that no mistake was made in the
discharge of the voluntary element. Then why should there not be a presumption in favor of the
resultant belief? But what would it mean for there to be a mistake? For Cohen, the mistake is in
not subjecting the intuited causal law or causal dependency to test, in not acquiring further
information. The question concerning the reliability of causal intuition becomes whether there
always, in every context, is this obligation to seek this further information. This is a question in
the ethics of belief. Do the examples in W.K. Clifford's classic paper indicate how we might
answer this question?
Consider the ship owner. Practically the first thing Clifford tells us is that of his ship,
"He knew that she was old, and not over-well built at the first; that she had seen many
seas and climes, and often had needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that
possibly she was not seaworthy." (Clifford 1886: 339)

Clifford is not faulting the ship owner for not gathering further evidence, but for flagrantly
disregarding the evidence before him. This contrasts with his second example, where agitators
are at fault simply for responding to rumors about certain individuals and for having done no
investigation to ascertain the truth of those rumors. Here the fault seems clearly to be not
gathering proper evidence.
We may argue, however, that the agitators also were wilfully disregarding information in
their evidential situation. They believed that certain individuals had manipulated "the laws of
their country in such a way as to remove children from the care of their natural and legal
guardians; and even of stealing them away and keeping them concealed from their friends and
relations." (Clifford 1886: 340) This is an ascription of personal responsibility. Since the
agitators accepted this interpretation on the basis of rumor and thus the word of others, the belief
is not an instance of personal (as opposed to causal) empirical intuition on their part. But surely
this mechanism of taking one's word is not reliable in general. Reliability requires the context in
which testimony is received to include certain evidential features. The absence of those features
raises the question of whether there is any presumption for a person's word. But surely if a word
is just rumor, those features are absent, and their absence is part of the evidential situation. So
like the ship owner, the agitators were wilfully disregarding evidence that undercut the presumption for their ascription of responsibility.
This leads to the following question for causal intuition. Are the situations in which causal
intuition may be employed always such as to call the presumptive reliability of causal intuition
into question? Do such situations always contain evidence or raise questions whose wilful
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disregard would undercut any presumption for causal intuition? The question needs clarification.
Consider the ship owner again. That his judgment of the ship's seaworthiness is false is not
merely a logical possibility. It is not just that there is some possible world in which the ship goes
down. Given the owner's evidence, the ship's not being seaworthy is a causally nomic possibility.
The mere fact that one can conceive of an interpretive belief arrived at through causal intuition to
be false is not sufficient to call the presumptive reliability of causal intuition into question. There
must be a real possibility of its falsehood. To substitute logical for real possibility here would be
to engage in epistemic scrupulosity.
Contrast the ship owner with the undergraduates. On the basis of commonly accepted
associations, the students "recognized" features in the drawings, exaggerations of certain parts of
the body, which were not there in actuality. They were projecting on the basis of these
associations. Recall that the students did not know of the evidence discrediting the common
associations on which they were basing their projections. The evidentiary situation for these
students then is different from the situation in both of Clifford's examples. The ship owner knew
of evidence that the ship was not seaworthy. The agitators knew that the source of the allegations
was rumor and not trustworthy testimony. Clearly the ship owner had an epistemic duty to secure
sufficient counterevidence—if such could be found—that the ship was sound; the agitators had
an epistemic duty to gather reliable evidence—if any existed—for the allegations before they
would be within their epistemic rights to accept these judgments. But did the undergraduates
have an epistemic duty to gather evidence for the associations underlying their projections,
which were apparently vouched for by common sense? Unlike the undergraduates, the clinicians
were aware of disconfirming evidence and thus had an epistemic duty to gather counterevidence
to justify the association before projecting according to it. But did the undergraduates have a
similar duty? Why, in the absence of evidence, should they question the association? Would it
not be an epistemic counsel of perfection, enjoining scrupulosity, to say that they did? So it
seems that the undergraduates' evidentiary situation did not call into question the presumptive
reliability of their belief-generating mechanism whereby they projected from the diagnosis to the
symptom. To be sure, there was some evidence before these students that their projections were
faulty. Careful inspection, possibly with the aid of rulers, could show that the drawings did not
manifest the features the students "saw" in them. But where was there evidence in the situation
that this amount of care in perceptually observing the drawing was called for?
Notice that there are two places where the will can enter into the operation of causal
intuition proceeding according to natural kinds. On the basis of observations made, one sees
certain objects as being of a natural kind and on the basis of the theory occupying the essence
placeholder one projects from certain observed features of the observed instances of the natural
kind to members of the kind in general. Hence the will can affect the amount of perceptual
information taken into account and it can affect whether or not to accept the nomic principles
making up the theory substituted for the essence placeholder. Evidence that in perceiving the
situation further relevant information was overlooked or that evidence counting against the
nomic principles incorporated into the theory constituting the essence of the natural kind was
disregarded undercuts the presumption of reliability of causal intuition in those cases. But where
there is no such evidence, why should we say that causal intuition is not presumptively reliable?
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By contrast, let us consider an example of the intuition of a causal dependency on the basis
of observed covariation.4 Suppose one observed bees returning on a number of occasions to a
container of sugar water placed on a blue card and formed the belief on the basis of this
experience that bees were sensitive to the color blue, i.e., if something were a bee, it would be
able to discriminate the color blue. Is this belief formed reliably and if not, are there evidential
factors in the situation that undercut the presumptive reliability of the belief? The answer to the
first question is negative and its explanation gives a positive answer to the second. Being able to
discriminate color—blue at least—is just one of a number of possible relevant variables which
could explain the observed bee behavior. Bees might be returning to the card because they
recognized its shape or relative location, or because they are responding to the smell of the
sugar-water in the container. The alleged nomic connection is questionable precisely because of
this multiplicity of nomically possible relevant variables. To be justified that color discrimination
explains the bees' behavior one would need to rule out the other variables. The problem here is
failure to discharge the burden of proof raised by these other variables.
Contrasting the platypus example considered earlier and the bee example is instructive in
showing why there is a presumption of reliability in the first case but not in the second. In the
platypus case, part of the theory filling the essence placeholder of the natural kind term
"platypus" is the causal regularity that given the internal physiological structure of platypuses—
whatever that might be, members of the species reproduce in a certain particular way—whatever
that is. This regularity is quite preliminary. It does not tell us the specific way in which
platypuses reproduce or how that is tied to certain physiological features. But it does assert that
this mode of reproduction will be uniform and not variable across the species. Hence, when we
perceive a platypus reproducing by laying eggs, we are justified in projecting this feature to
platypuses in general.
Contrast this with the bee case. Here certain regular bee behavior is observed. But here we
do not have as part of our theory of the essence of this natural kind that bees are so constituted
physiologically that returning behavior is determined by one and only one variable. Such a claim
of regularity would incur a significant burden of proof. Our theory of the essence does not
propose some determinable of which "responding to blue" is the determinate. Rather than
projecting according to a theory of determinable/determinate uniformity incorporated into the
essence theory, the object of the inquiry here is to determine what causal regularity concerning
color discrimination should be incorporated into the theory of the essence of this natural kind.
Since many relevant variables may affect color discrimination, this question cannot be settled
through empirical intuition alone. Testing the relevant variables is required and the resultant
belief justified by the evidence these tests generate is an inferred, not a basic belief. That other
relevant variables are causally possible is part of the evidential situation. Thus to accept a
judgment before these tests have been completed is to disregard part of the evidence in the
situation.
That the internal physiological structure of members of a species determines some uniform
mode of reproduction for that species seems to follow from the very notion of a species. Given
this understanding of species, there should be a presumption for this causal claim. Other nonbasic causal claims may enter into the theory filling the essence placeholder in some natural kind
4.

. This example is based on Cohen's discussion of von Frisch's experimental work on bees in (1977: 129-33).
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term. For example, our theory might contain a causal law received on testimony from a trusted
authority as apparently was the association accepted by the undergraduates. The point is that as
long as there is a presumption for this causal law, the presumption of reliability for causal
intuition proceeding according to this law is not compromised.
Given these considerations, we may argue for the conditional reliability of causal intuition
proceeding according to natural kinds. We should like to call this a Reidian argument, since it
parallels how we can argue for the presumptive reliability of sense perception on Reidian
grounds. For Reid, it is by virtue of certain principles of our constitution that certain sensations
or features of our sensations become signs of external qualities. We should be acting against our
nature to reject these natural signs or to regard them as unreliable. Indeed, not only would we be
going against our nature, Reid feels it would be impossible to carry out this rebellion. Reason
cannot certify this reliability. But to appeal to reason for such certification is wrongheaded. The
presumption of reliability for sense perception is not a matter of reason but of common sense.
Hence, unless we are confronted with evidence to the contrary, we may concede the genuineness
or reliability of the signs manifested in perception. Indeed, these natural signs, the fact that
features of our sensations or how we are appeared to suggest or are signs of qualities in external
objects, are first principles of our nature.
All reasoning must be from first principles; and for first principles no other reason can be
given but this, that, by the constitution of our nature, we are under a necessity of
assenting to them. Such principles are parts of our constitution, no less than the power of
thinking. (Reid 1983: 57-58.)

As long as in taking account of the information which will back, in Toulmin's sense, the
projection made on the basis of a natural kind, one has not wilfully suppressed information, and
as long as one has not admitted unjustified causal laws or nomic principles into one's
understanding of the essence of the natural kind, then to project according to that kind and to
form the corresponding subjunctive conditional beliefs is part of our constitution. That causal
intuition in this employment is reliable is thus a first principle as are the particular beliefs
generated in this way. They form part of the basic premises from which we reason. Propositional
justification appeals ultimately to such premises, which do not themselves need propositional
justification or to be justified by reason.
The condition then for the presumptive reliability of causal intuition proceeding according to
natural kinds is the right operation of the will in both places where it can enter into the operation
of this mechanism. Notice that in some instances the condition is simpler, since the will is not
operating to admit principles into the essence. We may speak of the developmental nature of
essence concepts. Initially an essence just indicates that a natural kind has an "outside" and an
"inside," letting us identify some of the observable properties of the instances of that kind as
following from the internal structure and thus being essential. We do not come to accept that the
essence has this structure on the basis of evidence. Our recognizing this structure is immediate,
like coming to form a perceptual belief on the basis of being appeared to in a certain way. The
will does not enter here. As our understanding of the internal structure increases, so does the
richness and precision of the essence concept. But surely there is a presumption for the initial
minimal filler for the essence placeholder. If our argument has shown anything, it is that
discriminating an inside from an outside, regarding natural kinds, is part of our constitution. So
long as there is a presumption for any additional nomic principles admitted into the essence, a
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presumption which could be ensured by accepting these principles on the basis of presumptively
reliable testimony or proper evidence generated through tests, so long as the will operates
according to these principles—and backing information has not been wilfully disregarded—the
presumption for causal intuition's reliability is maintained.
Notice how the situation is different with respect to intuiting nomic connections simply on
the basis of detecting covariation. One observes that one property occurs conjointly with another.
Is this simply an accident of what has been observed or does it indicate a nomic connection?
Unlike the case with natural kind terms, letting us distinguish essence from accident, there is no
theory to discriminate "essential covariation" from "accidental covariation." To be confident that
this intuited connection were genuinely nomic, one would need to know that no other relevant
variables needed to be taken into account in this situation. But then the belief in the nomic
connection would be acceptable on the basis of this propositional evidence and not as a basic
belief. Thus in this employment there is not a presumption for causal intuition as a mechanism
generating basic beliefs as there is with causal intuition guided by natural kinds.
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